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Abstract – Wireless Mesh Networks can provide low 
cost and reliable community-owned connectivity in 
developing rural areas. A rural community can use mesh 
networks to access a wide range of modern information 
and communication technologies, and as such, protection 
of these networks from malicious behavior is very 
important. While there has been work into securing 
mesh networks, almost none of it has been applied within 
the Village Telco, or mesh potato, arena. It is against this 
background that this paper advocates the investigation 
of security weaknesses of and solutions for mesh potato 
networks by intervening with a particular security set-up 
of the mesh potatoes used in the deployment of a rural 
community wireless mesh network in Mankosi 
Community located in the Eastern Cape Province in 
South Africa. These devices currently have no protection 
in ad hoc mode. This work in progress paper describes 
how we plan to provide and test security for this mesh. 
 
Index Terms— Limited Range Communications:  
Ad-hoc, WiFi; Internet Services & End User 
Applications: Cryptography. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper describes work in progress to provide security for 
a wireless mesh network (WMN) deployed in a rural 
community called Mankosi, located in the Eastern Cape 
province of South Africa. The primary objective of this 
study is to secure the network in ad hoc mode. There has 
been a lot of research into mesh security. The main problem 
is that the mesh potatoes (MP), the routers used in the 
wireless mesh network in Mankosi, provide no security at 
all in mesh mode. The ethos of the open-hard/software 
approach to a Village Telco (see www.villagetelco.org), 
says it is community-owned, ground-up and therefore, 
anyone ought to be able to get on the network with a mesh 
potato and make VoIP calls within the mesh for free; hence, 
no security. However, the Tribal Authority (the informal 
governance structures) of Mankosi is intent on charging for 
local in-mesh calls, and to use revenues for network 
maintenance and expansion. Because we need security, then, 
there is the technical problem of distributed authentication, 
which is the suitable security approach for ad hoc mode. 
This project is an exploration of the balance between these 
social and technical goals.  
There is need to learn how to secure the ad hoc side of the 
network so that access to and on the network can be 
controlled. Certificate authority is commonly used for most 
existing mesh networks, and CA is problematic; central 
authentication has a single point of failure and cannot work 
well where members constantly need to renew or revoke 
their membership in the network like in a mesh network. 
Therefore, this project involves surveying the existing 
literature on mesh network security in order to ascertain 
which mechanisms are most appropriate for a mesh potato 
network, and how best to implement them on the devices to 
support ad hoc mode. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The Bridging Application and Network Gaps (BANG) 
group in the Department of Computer Science at the 
University of the Western Cape (UWC), through 
consultations with the rural community, implemented a 
wireless mesh network in the rural community of Mankosi 
in 2012. The network currently has a dozen MPs, with some 
links up to several kilometres. A mesh potato is a marriage 
of a low-cost wireless access point capable of running a 
mesh networking protocol with an Analog Telephony 
Adapter (ATA) [1]. The MPs multiplex infrastructure and 
ad-hoc modes, thus providing a widely distributed hotspot. 
Three wireless security protocols are available in 
infrastructure mode: Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP), Wi-
Fi Protected Access (WPA), and Wi-Fi Protection Access 
Version 2 (WPA2/802.11i). There is not any security 
mechanism provided for ad-hoc mode. That means packets 
are exchanged between the mesh stations unencrypted and 
any MP can join the network if the Service Set Identifier 
(SSID) is known; a situation that attackers can easily 
exploit. Consequently, the security of the network in ad hoc 
mode must be addressed. 
III. RELATED WORK 
Mesh networks are a type of ad-hoc network and access 
control in ad-hoc networks is a persistent challenge [2]. 
Approaches include centralized authentication, distributed 
authentication and some encryption methods. It is important 
to note here that there appears to be no recent work that 
discusses a different approach from the ones mentioned 
above. This section discusses proposals based on 
asymmetric cryptography to secure ad hoc networks.  
Dahill et al. [3] propose a security protocol called 
Authenticated Routing for Ad hoc Networks (ARAN), in 
which every node forwarding a route request and route reply 
message must sign it. Although their approach could provide 
strong security, placing a digital signature on every routing 
packet could lead to performance bottleneck on computation 
in the mesh nodes as they have restricted memory and 
processing power [4]. Zapata [5] proposes a Secure Ad hoc 
On-demand Distance Vector (SAODV) routing protocol, an 
extension of the Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector 
(AODV). SAODV assumes that each ad hoc node has a 
signature key pair from a suitable asymmetric cryptosystem. 
The mesh nodes could suffer from high processing overhead 
associated with an asymmetric cryptosystem, and as such 
the approach is not suitable for the limited capacity MP.  
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Some researchers have proposed the use of symmetric 
cryptography for authenticating ad hoc routing protocols, 
based on the assumption that a security association (a shared 
key) between the source node and the destination node exist. 
For example, Papadimitratos and Hass [6] propose a 
Securing Routing Protocol (SRP), which can be applied to 
several existing routing protocols. In this approach, Message 
Authentication Code (MAC) along with shared key is used 
to provide end-to-end security. 
The protocols discussed above except [3] make an 
assumption that there is a centralized global trusted 
certificate authority (CA) providing efficient key 
distribution and management in the network [4]. But central 
authentication has a single point of failure; when central 
device is not available there is no way to renew or revoke 
other members [2]. To mitigate this problem, the concept of 
threshold secret sharing has recently been introduced [4]. 
Zhou and Haas [7] use a partially distributed certificate 
authority scheme in which a group of special nodes is 
capable of generating partial certificates using their shares 
of the certificate-signing key. A valid certificate can be 
obtained by combining a certain fixed number of such 
partial certificates. The weakness of the solution is that it 
requires an administrative infrastructure available to 
distribute the shares to the special nodes.  Deng et al. 
propose another approach based on threshold secret sharing; 
but instead of using the traditional public key cryptography 
mechanism, they use an identity-based cryptosystem to 
provide end-to-end authentication [4]. In this approach, the 
capabilities of certificate authority (CA) are distributed to all 
the nodes in the network and any operations requiring the 
CA’s private key can only be performed by a coalition of 
certain number of nodes. Distributing the CA to all the 
nodes in the network provides good availability since all 
nodes are part of the CA service.  
IV. METHODOLOGY 
This work intends to provide the security for a rural 
WMN in mesh mode on the mesh potato platform. To 
achieve that, our research entails the following research 
questions: which security mechanisms are necessary and 
appropriate in WiFi mesh mode? How can we implement 
them in mesh mode on the mesh potato? Which mechanisms 
are secure for the mesh mode of mesh potatoes? A security 
mechanism, which is secure and applicable to mesh potatoes 
in Wi-Fi mesh mode, will be determined. Only mechanisms 
that include encryption of the payload as one of the security 
components will be considered. To do this, we will follow 
an experimental research methodology with practical trials 
and experiments conducted in a research laboratory 
followed by in-the-field trials on the rural WMN. A 
qualitative evaluation with mesh end users will complement 
the pursuit of technical security validation.  
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
The security weaknesses of the mesh nodes potatoes in 
the mesh network implemented in Mankosi have been 
identified. The next step is to do a critical analysis of 
existing security mechanisms for mesh networks, which has 
commenced via a literature review to identify mechanisms 
that are applicable in ad hoc mode. Once identified, we will 
inject security functionality into the MP firmware and carry 
out experimentation in the laboratory. To identify which 
mechanism or combination of mechanisms is truly secure 
for the mesh potatoes, we will identify, explore and adapt 
WiFi cracking software tools, which are freely available 
from the Internet. Then we will evaluate the mechanisms in 
the laboratory by conducting trials with these software tools. 
The ones that are resistant to the cracking software will be 
considered for incorporation into the mesh potato platform, 
and tested on the Mankosi rural mesh network. 
In conclusion, the security of wireless mesh networks is 
an ongoing research challenge, and in particular, has not yet 
been provided for in the mesh potato domain. This project 
seeks to rectify that problem and as an outcome provide a 
framework and guidelines for the injection and verification 
of security mechanisms into ad hoc mesh platforms, using 
the mesh potato platform as an experimental example. 
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